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Greenhouse gases trap heat in the Earth's atmosphere,
warming the Earth's surface in a process that scientists call
"radiative forcing."' Some radiative forcing is essential: without
it, energy received from the Sun's rays would escape back into
space, the Earth's surface would be colder than the freezing point
of water, and life would not survive. But with too much (or too
rapid) radiative forcing, the climate changes in ways that harm
ecosystems and human societies. As the amount of greenhouse
gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere has grown, so has concern that
their enhanced radiative forcing effect may induce dangerous
climate change. Policy makers have therefore sought ways to
forestall climate change and to cope with its impacts.2
Perkins Professor of Law, and Professor of Environmental Policy and of
Public Policy Studies, Duke University; University Fellow, Resources for the
Future (RFF). This paper was prepared as a contribution to the symposium on
"Breaking the Logjam: An Environmental Law for the 21st Century," held at
NYU Law School, 28-29 March 2008. The author is grateful for helpful
comments from Robert Crandall, Donald Elliott, Nathaniel Keohane, William
Pederson, Jedediah Purdy, David Schoenbrod, Richard Stewart, and Katrina
Wyman; and for research assistance from Natasha Pajic.
' See COMM. ON RADIATIVE FORCING EFFECTS ON CLIMATE, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, RADIATIVE FORCING OF CLIMATE CHANGE: EXPANDING
THE CONCEPT AND ADDRESSING UNCERTAINTIES (2005); WORKING GROUP I,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC WORKING GROUP I
CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS
2-5 (2007), available at http://ipcc-wgl.ucar.edu/wgl/docs/WG1AR4_SPM_
PlenaryApproved.pdf.
2 The organizers of the Breaking the Logjam symposium-Dick Stewart,
David Schoenbrod, and Katrina Wyman-specifically asked the symposium
authors to address the design of environmental law, and not the degree of
protection warranted nor the seriousness of the problem being addressed. Thus,
this article does not discuss how serious a threat climate change- is nor how
stringent limits on greenhouse gas emissions (or other policy measures) should
be. For discussion of those questions, see infra notes 65-67 and accompanying
text (on benefit-cost studies of optimal climate change policy); RICHARD B.
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In turn, a serious policy to combat climate change can-and
should-radiate a powerful influence, driving important
improvements in environmental law. This article argues that well-
designed climate policy will both address the climate problem, and
help "break the logjam" by propelling significant reforms in the
structure of U.S. environmental governance.
The "logjam" metaphor refers to the absence of major new
environmental legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress since
the 1990s. 3 To the extent that the "logjam" is a real problem, the
root causes are not only generalized partisan gridlock (afflicting all
types of policy), but also the particular features of environmental
law that have diminished its appeal and blocked its advance. The
design of much past environmental law has suffered from four key
problems: fragmentation, insensitivity to tradeoffs, rigid
STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY: BEYOND
KYOTO (2003) [hereinafter RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY] (arguing that
despite uncertainties, climate change is a serious risk worth combating through
well-designed cost-effective policies).
3 For description and evidence of the "logjam," see Carol A. Casazza
Herman, David Schoenbrod, Richard B. Stewart & Katrina Wyman, Breaking
the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New Congress and Administration,
17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2008); RICHARD LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 125-65. (2004) (documenting the slowdown in enactment
of major new environmental legislation by the U.S. Congress since about 1990,
and the widening divergence of environmental attitudes between the two main
political parties since that time).
At the same time, however, the period from 1990 to 2007 has not been
silent: there have been major U.S. environmental policy actions undertaken
during that time, including, among others, the enormous task of implementing
the numerous programs launched in the 1990 CAA Amendments, including large
new regulatory programs on acid rain, hazardous air pollutants (air toxics), and
substances that deplete stratospheric ozone; the enactment in 1996 of the major
Safe Drinking Water Act amendments and the Food Quality Protection Act, both
with strong bipartisan backing; the adoption in 1997 and again in 2008 of major
EPA rules on ground-level ozone and fine particulate matter; the adoption of
stringent new rules on diesel engine emissions by both the Clinton and
subsequent Bush administrations; an array of land use policies including large
new protected areas of federal lands; the Clean Air Interstate Rule adopted in
2004 (now in litigation with the possibility of legislative enactment); and the
international agreement to phase out HCFCs (potent agents of stratospheric
ozone depletion, and also potent greenhouse gases) in 2007. For discussion of
these and other developments, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Convergence,
Divergence, and Complexity in U.S. and European Risk Regulation, in GREEN
GIANTS?: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION 73-109 (Norman Vig & Michael Faure eds., 2004).
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prescriptive commands, and mismatched scale.4  These are
problems with the design of regulatory systems, not a rejection of
the overall objective of environmental law to protect ecosystems
and human health. These four design defects raised the costs,
reduced the benefits, and increased the countervailing risks of
many of the environmental laws enacted in the 1960s, 70s, and
80s. 5 The "logjam" since the 1990s reflects the accretion of these
problems in the accumulated edifice of environmental law built up
since the 1960s, with predictable political results: the growing
perception (perhaps overstated, but perceived nonetheless) that
environmental law is costly and rigid yet generates limited gains.
Industry and political conservatives (and many centrists) opposed
the high costs. Attempting to force the Congress and the public to
adopt new laws perceived as very costly became a losing battle.
Meanwhile, many environmental advocacy groups (though not all)
resisted design strategies to reduce the cost of environmental law,
notably market-based economic incentive systems such as
emissions trading, in part because these groups feared that such
flexible incentives would spawn damaging and unfair hotspots of
concentrated pollution-in effect, a risk-risk tradeoff. The
principal environmental laws successfully enacted since the
1990s-breakouts from the logjam-were laws consciously
designed to reduce costs and overcome the prior design defects: for
example, the 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments used an
ambitious emissions trading program to reduce acid rain (despite
some concerns about hotspots), and the 1996 Safe Drinking Water
Act amendments authorized attention to both risk-risk and cost-
benefit tradeoffs.
A basic lesson from this history is that environmental
protection, like other social goods, will generally be adopted more
frequently and more ambitiously if its design promises to be less
costly and more effective. Higher-cost and lower-payoff policy
designs are less likely to be adopted. Environmental advocates
frustrated by the logjam in environmental law should see improved
4 See Stewart, Schoenbrod & Wyman, supra note 3.
5 See STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TowARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993); RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener eds.,
1995); J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE
UNITED STATES (1998).
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(more cost-effective) regulatory design as a key element of the
way forward.
If the logjam persists into the future, then the adoption of
serious climate change legislation would be a formidable jam-
breaking step-perhaps the greatest jam-breaker ever. The logjam
looks ripe for breaking in 2009, because it will be the first year of
the new Presidential administration (both President-elect Barack
Obama and Senator John McCain have endorsed strong climate
legislation); and because 2009 will also be the year in which the
Bali Action Plan (adopted in December 2007) calls for agreement
to be reached in Copenhagen on a new climate change treaty to
follow and improve on the Kyoto Protocol.6 Sir Nick Stem's
recent report calls climate change "the greatest and widest-ranging
market failure ever seen" 7-which would make a successful legal
regime to combat climate change the greatest environmental law
ever seen. And by the same criterion, the absence of good climate
policy-or botching it-would be the greatest government failure
ever seen.
To meet this challenge, good climate policy will learn from
experience and improve on the design of past environmental law,
fostering four counterpart solutions to the prior design defects:
cross-cutting integration instead of fragmentation, attention to
tradeoffs instead of their neglect, flexible incentive-based policy
instruments such as emissions trading in place of rigid prescriptive
commands, and optimal instead of mismatched scale. This article
advocates a design for U.S. climate policy that embodies these four
design solutions. There are numerous policy options for
addressing climate change; this article focuses on policies to limit
GHG emissions. It proposes a policy that is comprehensive in its
coverage of multiple pollutants (all GHGs), their sources and
sinks, multiple sectors (indeed economy-wide), and multiple issues
currently divided among separate agencies. It advocates explicit
6 Conference of the Parties, United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 3-15, 2007, Decision I/CP.13: Bali Action Plan 1, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Bali Action Plan]
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop 13/eng/06a01 .pdf#page=3.
7 Nicholas Stem, The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change,
Executive Summary i (2006), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/4/3/executivesummary.pdf. One can agree with this
characterization even if one does not agree with the specific numerical figures in
the Stern Review's estimate of climate change damages or policy costs.
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attention to tradeoffs, both benefit-cost and risk-risk (including
both ancillary harms and ancillary benefits), in setting the goals
and boundaries of climate policy. It advocates the use of flexible
market-based incentives through an efficient cap-and-trade system,
with gradual multi-year emissions reduction schedules that are
reviewed periodically in light of new information. And it
advocates matching the legal regime to the environmental and
economic scale of the climate problem, starting at the global level,
engaging all the major emitting countries (including the U.S. and
China), and then implementing at the national and sub-national
levels-rather than a patchwork bottom-up approach.8 The article
addresses how this proposal would help overcome political
obstacles. It focuses on the structure of environmental
8 In a series of publications over the past two decades, I examined in greater
detail the pros and cons of this comprehensive global GHG cap-and-trade
system, compared to a C0 2-only policy, an emissions tax, and a prescriptive
technology standard to limit emissions. See, e.g., RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE
POLICY, supra note 2; Jonathan B. Wiener, Designing Global Climate
Regulation, in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 151-87 (Stephen Schneider, Armin
Rosencranz & John-O Niles eds., 2002); Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B.
Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Policy, 9 ARIz. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 83 (1992); Jonathan B. Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation:
Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677 (1999).
For a recent and carefully articulated proposal of a similar cap-and-trade
system for the United States, see Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-
Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 293 (2008).
Other policy options could include: federal subsidies or tax credits for
technology adoption, federally funded R&D on new technologies, policies to
protect and enhance carbon sinks such as forests, information disclosure
requirements such as a national GHG emissions inventory, and geoengineering
projects (such as using particles or mirrors to deflect some solar radiation away
from the earth). Some of these policies could complement a GHG emissions
limitation policy. For example, a federal technology R&D program could be
adopted to overcome the market failure in basic research and intellectual
property incentives and to spur innovation of new technologies. At the same
time a GHG emissions limit could be adopted through a cap-and-trade or tax
system to overcome the market failure in environmental externalities, which
would have the ancillary benefit of encouraging the diffusion and adoption of
those new technologies. See Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell & Robert N.
Stavins, A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and Environmental Policy,
54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164 (2005). Further, adaptation policies could be adopted
to help cope with the impacts of climate change, such as sea level rise, storm
damage, droughts or floods or other changes in water cycles, agricultural
dislocations, the spread of tropical diseases, heat- and cold-related illnesses,
species extinctions and other ecosystem disturbances, ocean acidification, and
other effects.
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governance, not on the degree of protection. And it explores how
such a climate policy would influence other areas of law.
Among environmental issues, climate change is ideally suited
to these improved policy design features because its potentially
high cost demands a low-cost policy instrument, because GHGs do
not generally pose local impacts that threaten hotspots, and
because the global scale and economy-wide character of GHG
emissions are well understood.
The harms from unchecked climate change (even accounting
for uncertainties), and the costs of climate policy, are both
substantially larger than those of most or all other environmental
issues. Countries see their standard of living and their geopolitical
future tied to the activities that emit GHGs. Climate policy is thus
not only environmental policy, it is economic policy, and it is.
power politics. The costs of major GHG reductions are so high
that no one seriously advocates enacting a law for GHGs that
ignores cost, or that requires the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to set pollution levels without considering cost (as
the courts have held that part of the CAA requires for conventional
pollutants). Industry generally wants costs considered and limited
(although occasionally some industry subgroups seek expensive
regulations to raise their rivals' costs), and it is becoming (or
should be) understood by environmentalists as well that the higher
the cost of a climate policy, the less ambitious the policy that
legislators will be willing to enact. The fact that GHGs mix
globally in the atmosphere means that hotspots are not a major
concern-indeed much less of a concern than they were in the
successful 1990 acid rain trading program-and thus
environmental advocates can espouse the flexibility of a cap-and-
trade system for GHGs. This combination of features substantially
explains the growing consensus in the United States in favor of an
incentive-based cap-and-trade system to limit GHG emissions. 9
Meanwhile, the sources and sinks of GHGs are ubiquitous-
multiple gases in every sector and in every major country-and the
9 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal
Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1499, 1550-58
(2007) (explaining how these factors, along with the use of allowance allocations
to placate those who bear costs and reward early emissions reductions, together
account for the observed support for a GHG cap-and-trade system by both
industry and environmental groups, and at both the state and federal level).
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mobility of economic activities in a globalizing world is so great
that broad scale and cross-cutting integration are crucial to the
success of climate policy. Small scale or narrowly targeted
policies will just induce "leakage" of emitting activities,
undermining the policy's environmental effectiveness and
discouraging legislators from enacting it.
Climate change policy is too important to neglect, too
important to get wrong, and too consequential to address without
integrating across the economy, confronting tradeoffs in costs and
risks, using the most cost-effective incentive instruments, and
matching the relevant scale. Where some past environmental
policy has been enacted without addressing these four issues,
climate policy is just too big to do so.' 0
Two decades ago, policy discussions were far from this
approach. Instead, policy discussions in 1989-90 focused on a
narrow and rigid approach that would have regulated carbon
dioxide alone (not other GHGs), from sources (neglecting sinks) in
the energy sector only (omitting other sectors) using rigid
regulatory instruments, in wealthy countries only. I and others
criticized this approach and proposed a comprehensive, incentive-
based policy design.11 The international climate treaties (the
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in 1992, and
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997) made partial headway, adopting a
comprehensive approach and authorizing a cap-and-trade incentive
system, but omitted effective action by China and other major
developing country emitters, ultimately losing U.S. participation as
a result. 12 The leading bills in the current U.S. Congress would
adopt an economy-wide multi-gas cap-and-trade system, but still
omit some sectors, and leave open how China and other emerging
great powers would be engaged. 13  The political machinery is
,0 For commentary on the seriousness of climate change and how stringent
climate policy should be, see supra note 2.
" I detailed this history in Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for
Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental
Law, 27 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1295, 1309 (2001). We made our proposals within the
U.S. government and then to the international negotiating committee. See id.
We published papers advocating our approach in 1990-92, including Stewart &
Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Policy, supra note 8.
12 See RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 2, at 1-17.
'3 See, e.g., America's Climate Security Act, S.2191, 110th Cong. (2007). A
caveat is that ACSA, also known as the Lieberman-Wamer bill, initially covers
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gradually groping toward a climate policy that matches the scope
of the problem-system it is meant to regulate. 14 If climate policy is
to break the logjam, this article suggests how it should be designed
to do so.
I. INTEGRATION
Traditionally, U.S. environmental law has advanced
piecemeal, adopting statutes targeted at specific media (such as air,
water, or land) or problems (such as oil spills, solid waste, species
loss), often in response to particular incidents, and delegating
implementation to distinct agencies or sub-agency programs
overseen by counterpart legislative subcommittees. The result has
been a fragmented pattern of authority, with environmental issues
compartmentalized and regulated by decision makers who focus
narrowly on each bounded domain.1 5
The EPA, created in 1970, was initially intended to be an
integrated actor taking a comprehensive, holistic view of the
environment, but it quickly became subdivided into separate
programs for air, surface water, drinking water, wastes, and
pesticides.16  And other agencies took on environmental
management responsibilities as well, including the Department of
Agriculture's (USDA) Forest Service, the Department of Interior's
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Fish & Wildlife Service
(FWS), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of
Commerce's National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), the
Department of Labor's Occupational Safety & Health
Administration (OSHA), the Department of Defense's Army Corps
electric power, industry and transportation, but not agriculture and forestry.
14 See STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (criticizing
"mismatches" between regulatory policy designs and the problems to be
regulated); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT 113 (1962) (proposing that optimal jurisdiction size match the scope of
the externality to be regulated, subject to the costs of decision making).
15 See INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL (Nigel Haigh & Frances Irwin eds.,
1990); Lakshman Guruswamy, Comment, The Case for Integrated Pollution
Control, 54 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 42 (1991); Jonathan B. Wiener &
John D. Graham, Resolving Risk Tradeoffs in RISK VS. RISK, supra note 5, at
228-42.
16 See Alfred A. Marcus, EPA's Organizational Structure, 54 LAW. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991).
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of Engineers, the Department of Transportation's National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (DOT/NHTSA), and the
Coast Guard (once in Transportation, now in the Department of
Homeland Security), as well as others. At the White House, the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) attempt to coordinate these and
other agencies, but are only partially successful given the separate
statutes, funding, officers, and constituencies of each bureaucratic
domain.
Fragmentation can yield conflicting policies that frustrate
each other, or duplicative policies that waste effort. In the climate
arena, one example is the contested jurisdiction over automobile
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2) (regulated by EPA) and
automobile fuel economy (regulated by DOT/NHTSA), because
with current combustion technology, efforts to reduce CO 2
emissions seem to imply improvements in fuel economy.
The fragmented structure also leaves some gaps
unaddressed. 17 Notable among these is the weak or absent federal
regulatory authority over non-point source water pollution (run-off
from farms and impermeable surfaces)1 8 and, as this article
discusses, climate change.
And the fact that environmental systems are interconnected
means that narrowly targeted decisions by fragmented agencies
can also impose undesirable spillover effects on other domains-
one form of "risk-risk tradeoffs."' 19 For example, rules to reduce
one kind of pollution (such as air pollution) may yield cross-media
shifts that increase pollution into other media (such as water
pollution or solid waste). 20  EPA rules to reduce outdoor air
17 See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory
of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003).
18 See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental
Law, 27 ECOLOGY L. Q. 263, 287-91 (2000) (describing scope and deleterious
effects of agricultural run-off, a "leading source of impairment in the Nation's
rivers").
'9 See generally RISK VS. RISK, supra note 5 (advancing and analyzing the
concept of risk-risk tradeoffs).
20 See JOEL A. TARR, THE SEARCH FOR THE' ULTIMATE SINK (1996)
(discussing shifts of pollution from one environmental medium or "sink" to
another as a result of narrowly targeted regulations aimed at one medium at a
time).
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pollution may increase indoor air pollution regulated by OSHA.2 1
EPA or OSHA rules to phase out asbestos (including in automobile
brake linings) may increase traffic fatalities regulated by
NHTSA.22
One solution to the current fragmentation would be structural
integration through the merger of closely related agencies.23 This
could offer improved decisionmaking by avoiding conflicts and
duplications, filling gaps, and internalizing what had been cross-
domain risk-risk tradeoffs within the same agency. But risk-risk
tradeoffs can also occur within one agency's domain, as when
EPA's air pollution rules induce greater water pollution or solid
waste, or when NHTSA's fuel economy rules affect traffic safety.
And the transaction costs of such mergers should not be
overlooked; consider the recent strenuous efforts to combine
numerous agencies into the new Department of Homeland
Security. Centralizing power in one super-agency can slow down
decisions, encourage excessive reliance on a single point of view,
and magnify errors. More important than structural merger, then,
is an integrated decision framework in which each agency takes
into account side effects on other domains (and within its own);
and a supervisory body that can identify and fill gaps, reconcile
tradeoffs, and coordinate multi-agency actions.
Dealing with climate change highlights the shortcomings of
this fragmented structure. Because GHGs are emitted from
virtually every sector of human activity, including electricity
generation, industry, buildings, transportation, agriculture, and
21 See Adam M. Finkel & P. Barry Ryan, Risk in the Workplace: Where
Analysis Began and Problems Remain Unsolved, in RISK ASSESSMENT FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 204 (Mark Robson & William Toscano, eds., 2007)
(describing this risk tradeoff and an OSHA-EPA agreement in 1999 to address
it); OSHA and EPA Announce Coordinated Enforcement Effort, Jan. 23, 2000,
available at http://isul.indstate.edu/terc/transource/news/newsID=2.htm?
newsID=2.
22 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. U.S. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1225 (5th Cir.
1991).
23 See Wiener & Graham, supra note 15, at 252-60. The UK attempted such
a merger in the 1990s. See Neil Carter & Philip Lowe, The Establishment of a
Cross-Sector Environment Agency, in UK ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S
38 (T. Gray ed., 1995). China recently announced such mergers across its
government, including the creation of a new larger environment "superministry."
See Jim Yardley, China Retools its Government in Efficiency Push, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/world/
asia/12china.html.
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forestry, it makes little sense to target regulation one sector at a
time. Narrowly targeted rules would be both less environmentally
effective and more costly than economy-wide approaches.
Regulating one sector at a time may induce "leakage" of emitting
activities from that sector to others, undermining the
environmental efficacy of the regulation. 24  And narrow sector-
specific regulation would inhibit the flexibility to find the least
costly emissions abatement opportunities across all sectors.
But no one agency or statutory regime currently has authority
over all, or even many, of these sectors affecting the climate. In
the absence of new federal legislation governing GHG emissions
from the economy as a whole; we have recently witnessed a
scattershot of legal efforts across the array of statutes and agencies:
litigation to force EPA to regulate CO 2 emissions under the CAA
(and potential EPA regulation under the CAA yet to come);25 the
creation of a new energy technology agency (ARPA-E) but so far
no funding for its activities; 26 a new energy law with provisions to
increase vehicle fuel economy;2 7 a decision by the Fish & Wildlife
Service (FWS) to list polar bears as a threatened species (due to
Arctic ice melting) under the Endangered Species Act;28 litigation
to force diverse federal agencies to evaluate the climate impacts of
24 Leakage across countries is discussed further below. Leakage across
economic sectors might occur, for example, when a law that regulates GHG
emissions from fossil fuel combustion in the energy sector (but that does not
regulate the agriculture or forest sectors) induces increased use of biofuels grown
on farms with associated increased emissions of GHGs from the farms (and
decreased GHG sinks due to conversion of forest land to farm land). See
Timothy Searchinger, et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases
Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land Use Change, 319 SCIENCE
1238 (2008), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/
abstract/1 151861v1. Preventing such cross-sector leakage requires integration of
the significant emitting sectors into a comprehensive approach. For a discussion
of the inclusion of agriculture and forests in a comprehensive climate policy, see
RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 2; John M. Reilly & Malcolm 0.
Asadoorian, Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Land Use: Creating
Incentives within Greenhouse Gas EmissionsTrading Systems, 80 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 173 (2007); HARNESSING FARMS AND FORESTS IN THE Low-CARBON
ECONOMY: HOW TO CREATE, MEASURE, AND VERIFY GREENHOUSE GAS OFFSETS
(Zach Willey & Bill Chameides eds., 2007).
25 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
26 Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy, 42 U.S.C. § 16538 (2000).
27 Energy Independence and Security Act, Pub. Law No. 110-140 § 102, 121
Stat. 1492 (Dec. 19, 2007), section 102 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 32902).
28 See 73 Fed. Reg. 28,306 (May 15, 2008).
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their projects under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), the Administrative Procedure Act, and the decision
criteria of the relevant regulatory statute; 29  litigation in
international fora seeking recognition of human rights claims when
local cultures are injured by global warming; 30 the adoption by
several U.S. state governments of GHG control laws (such as in
California and the Western Climate Initiative, the northeastern
states joining the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), and
others);31 numerous cities' adoption of GHG control efforts (in part
through an agreement among hundreds of mayors); 32 common law
nuisance suits against GHG emitters (so far unsuccessful); 33
shareholders' efforts to force corporate boards to disclose their
firms' climate-related risks (or to persuade the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to mandate such disclosure); 34 and
others. These diverse initiatives are creative, but they are also
uncoordinated and incomplete, and have only a faint hope of
coalescing into a coherent national regulatory strategy. They are
understandable expressions of frustration with the lack of a
national policy.
One might think that coherent national regulation of GHG
29 See, e.g., Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 508 F.3d 508 (9th
Cir. 2007), and the Sierra Club, Natural Resource Defense Council, and
International Center for Technology Assessment's 2008 petition to CEQ to
require climate analyses in all environmental impact statements (EIS), available
at http://www.icta.org/doc/CEQ%20Petition%2OFinal%2OVersion%202-28-
O8. df
08 Such as the claim brought by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference in the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 2005, which argued that global
warming caused by United States is destroying the cultures and livelihoods of
indigenous peoples. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, INUIT
FILE PETITION WITH INTER-AMERCAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR
DANGEROUS IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2005), available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/COP 10_HandoutEJCIEL.pdf.
31 See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 9, at 1521-30 (surveying the states'
climate policies).
32 See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, CLIMATE PROTECTION AGREEMENT
(2005), available at http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/agreement.htm.
The agreement lists more than 800 mayors as signatories as of Sept. 16, 2008.
Id.
33 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., WL 2726871 (N. D. Cal. 2007).
34 See INVESTORS ACHIEVE MAJOR COMPANY COMMITMENTS ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CERES.ORG (2008), available at https://www.ceres.org/
NETCOMMUNITY/SSLPage.aspx?pid=928&srcid=705.
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emissions could be organized through the existing air pollution
laws, primarily the federal CAA. But for several years EPA
denied that it had the authority to regulate GHGs under the CAA
(until April 2007, when the U.S. Supreme Court held that it did
have such authority, in Massachusetts v. EPA). And in any event
the current federal CAA may not offer EPA effective instruments
for GHG emissions control. After Massachusetts v. EPA, the
agency has the power to regulate emissions of GHGs from new
motor vehicles and fuels, and EPA says it is now preparing to
propose such rules (while denying California the authority to adopt
its own alternative rule). 35  But even if EPA promulgates a
regulation soon, it will have limited effect because new vehicles
penetrate the full fleet only slowly, and by increasing the cost of
new vehicles, such rules encourage people to keep their old
(dirtier) cars longer. There may be no available on-board filter to
remove GHGs from the tailpipe, nor an alternative fuel (short of a
costly experimental new engine type such as a hydrogen fuel cell)
that markedly reduces GHG emissions (corn ethanol emits no less
than gasoline, and possibly much more if C0 2-sequestering forests
are cleared to grow more crops;36 cellulosic ethanol may do better,
and gas-electric hybrids may help, but benefits from plug-in
electric vehicles depend on the power source from which they get
their electric charge). EPA has little authority over existing
vehicles (except through regulating fuels), nor over how many
miles the vehicles are driven, public mass transit systems, or land
use planning.
35 After the court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA in April 2007, President
Bush issued an Executive Order directing EPA, DOT, DOE, and USDA to
coordinate a regulatory response regarding CO 2 emissions from vehicles. Exec.
Order No. 13,432, 72 Fed. Reg. 27717 (May 14, 2007). Meanwhile, California
was seeking a waiver from EPA under the federal CAA to enable California to
adopt its own rules for GHG emissions from vehicles (as it has sought for other
vehicle air pollutants in the past). EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson denied
the California request for a waiver in December 2007, with an explanation
published at 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008), arguing in part that GHG
emissions require a national policy. EPA's own national rule on GHGs from
vehicles has not yet been promulgated. EPA has issued an Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the
Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,353 (July 30, 2008) (discussing options and
problems with GHG regulation under the CAA), available at
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/anpr.html.
36 See Searchinger, supra note 24.
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After Massachusetts v. EPA, similar language in other parts of
the CAA probably also authorizes EPA to regulate emissions of
GHGs from stationary sources such as electric power plants and
industrial facilities. But these CAA provisions are a poor fit for
GHGs. EPA can require emissions controls at new or modified
stationary sources, but these rules penetrate the full economy only
slowly, plus they encourage firms to operate their old (dirtier)
facilities longer. For existing sources, EPA must mainly rely on a
statutory two-step in which EPA sets a national ambient air quality
standard (NAAQS) limiting the total amount of the pollutant in the
air, and then the states control the emissions (via state
implementation plans or SIPs) to attain that ambient standard
within each state. Yet this approach is virtually impossible for a
globally mixing pollutant like CO 2, whose ambient level within
each state depends on global, not local, emissions. (This point is
discussed further below in the section on Scale.) Thus, a new
integrated approach is warranted.
II. TRADEOFFS
Current laws and agency decisions often do not take adequate
account of tradeoffs. At least two kinds of tradeoffs are important:
risk-risk tradeoffs, and benefit-cost tradeoffs. Both should be
considered in making policy to prevent climate change. Indeed,
the U.S. has already committed to doing so. The 1992 Framework
Convention on Climate Change, to which the U.S. is a party,
provides in Article 4(1)(f) that each party shall: "employ
appropriate methods, for example impact assessments, formulated
and determined nationally, with a view to minimizing adverse
effects on the economy, on public health and on the quality of the
environment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to
mitigate or adapt to climate change."
A. Risk-Risk
Risk-risk tradeoffs occur when an intervention to reduce a
target risk also induces a change in another, ancillary risk. This
change can be an increase in the ancillary risk (called an ancillary
harm, side-effect, countervailing risk or dis-benefit), or a decrease
in the ancillary risk (called an ancillary benefit, coincident risk, or
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co-benefit).37 In much personal and government decision making,
only the change in the target risk is considered. In the real world
of interconnected economic and ecological systems, each
intervention affects a portfolio of multiple risks. Sound decision
making should evaluate these effects in concert and seek to reduce
overall risk.38
As noted above, fragmentation of authority can lead to risk-
risk tradeoffs. But even with cross-agency integration, narrowly
drawn climate change policies could pose risk-risk tradeoffs. For
example:
> Reductions in coal and oil combustion may involve risks
from the substitute energy sources, such as natural gas (e.g.
national security risks from dependence on foreign supplies;
explosions at liquified natural gas facilities), nuclear fission
(e.g. radioactive waste; accidents; weapons proliferation),
solar power (e.g. biodiversity loss from land devoted to
solar panel arrays), hydrogen fuels, or nuclear fusion.
> Cross-gas shifts: under a climate policy regulating only
C02, well-intentioned reductions in CO 2 emissions could
yield increases in emissions of other (unregulated) GHGs,39
37 See RISK VS. RISK, supra note 5, at 1-41. Attention to ancillary benefits
on equal footing with ancillary harms is urged in Samuel J. Rascoff and Richard
L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Health and
Environmental Regulatory Policy, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763 (2002). I agree; the
goal should be an evenhanded evaluation of the full portfolio of important
consequences induced by each intervention. See, e.g., RISK vs. RISK, supra note
5, at 2; Jessica Stem & Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution Against Terrorism, in
MANAGING STRATEGIC SURPRISE: LESSONS FROM RISK MANAGEMENT AND RISK
ASSESSMENT 110-83 (Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer & David Gordon eds., 2008);
Jonathan B. Wiener, Managing the Jatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9
RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT 39 (1998).
38 Risk-risk tradeoffs can be incorporated into benefit-cost analysis, but they
are conceptually distinct. Risk-risk tradeoffs are the vector of positive and
negative effects on the benefits side, irrespective of compliance cost. And in
practice, benefit-cost analysis often ignores risk-risk tradeoffs by focusing- only
on the target risk and on industry compliance cost. President Clinton's
Executive Order 12,866 (1993) and subsequent OMB guidance (especially
Circular A-4 (2003)) have instructed agencies to consider risk-risk tradeoffs, but
OMB's standard scoresheet (attached to Circular A-4) still omits ancillary risks.
See Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-4,
REGULATORY ANALYSIS 3, 26, 47 (2003).
39 See Stewart & Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate
Policy, supra note 8, at 91; Wiener, Protecting the Global Environment, in RISK
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such as increased methane (CH 4) emissions from leaky
natural gas systems. in some countries, or increased nitrous
oxide (N20) emissions from fertilizing corn to make ethanol
(or increased CO 2 levels from converting forests to cropland
for biofuels, noted above), or increased perfluorocarbon
(PFC) emissions from manufacturing aluminum to use in
vehicles instead of heavier (less fuel-efficient) steel. Using
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC)
index of global warming potential, CH4, N 20 and PFCs are,
respectively, about 25 times, 300 times, and 7,000 to 12,000
times more potent global warming gases than is CO 2 (per
kilogram over 100 years). 40 Hence even small increases in
emissions of these other gases could erase or override the
warming-preventive benefits of reducing CO 2 emissions.
> Similarly, phasing out CFCs (to protect the stratospheric
ozone layer) led to the use of substitute chemicals such as
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) and hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs). Because HCFCs also deplete stratospheric ozone,
the HCFCs are now being phased out as well under the
same treaties (the Montreal Protocol and its follow-on.
accords) that phased out CFCs. But because the HFCs do
not contain chlorine and thus do not deplete stratospheric
VS. RISK, supra note 5, at 209; RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 2,
at 60-63. Robert Stavins has proposed a cap-and-trade system limited to CO 2
only. See Stavins, supra note 8. While his proposal would make offset credits
available for reductions in other GHGs, it does not address the countervailing
risk of cross-gas shifts to emissions of unregulated non-CO 2 gases. See id. at
323.
40 See Forster, P., et al, Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in
Radiative Forcing, ch. 2, in IPCC WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE
BASIS, supra note 1, at 212 tbl.2.14 (showing the Global Warming potential
(GWP) index). Studies continue to assess the potency of GHGs not yet regulated
under the Kyoto Protocol, such as nitrogen trifluoride. See Michael J. Prather &
Juno Hsu, NF3: The Greenhouse Gas Missing from Kyoto, 35 Geophys. Res.
Letters L12810 (2008), available at http://www.agu.org/pubs/
crossref/2008/2008GLO34542.shtml. Meanwhile, compared to the IPCC GWP
index, more accurate metrics of the relative climate impacts of different gases
can be obtained through global climate models that account for the changing
atmosphere, see Alan S. Manne & Richard G. Richels, An alternative approach
to establishing trade-offs among greenhouse gases, 410 NATURE 675 (2001), and
through indices that account for the valuation of environmental impacts. See
James K. Hammitt, et al., A welfare-based index for assessing environmental
effects of greenhouse-gas emissions, 381 NATURE 301 (1996).
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ozone, they are not being addressed under those treaties; yet
they are potent GHGs (140 to 11,700 times more potent
than C0 2). Thus, in substituting HFCs for CFCs, ozone
depletion risk has been reduced while global climate risk
has been increased.4'
> Under some circumstances, sequestration of CO 2 in forests
could be increased by clearing a mature existing forest and
replanting the land with a young fast-growing type of tree.
But this would come at a loss in biodiversity. (And the
clearing of the mature forest might also liberate more CO 2
than the new forest sequesters, depending on the soil type
and on what is done with the cleared wood.) The Kyoto
Protocol gives credit for afforestation but not for conserving
existing forests against deforestation, hence exacerbating
this risk. Efforts to give credit for conserving existing
forests, such as through the system of Compensation for
Avoided Deforestation proposed by the Coalition of
Rainforest Nations (and the similar earlier proposal in the
Forests for the Future Initiative of -1992-93), are a
promising approach to curing this flaw.
> Some pollutants have a cooling effect. "Anthropogenic
contributions to aerosols.., together produce a cooling
effect," and, "volcanic and anthropogenic aerosols have
offset some warming that would otherwise have taken
place."42  Current air pollution laws seek to reduce these
pollutants-in order to protect public health against
inhalation-typically without considering the adverse effect
such reductions will have on global warming.43 The
41 Wiener, Protecting the Global Environment, supra note 39, at 198-201.
The Kyoto Protocol includes HFCs in its Annex A, and U.S. CAA section 612
gives EPA the authority to regulate CFC-substitutes to "reduce overall risk," so
HFCs posing a global warming risk could be regulated under that authority.
42 IPCC WORKING GROUP I CONTRIBUTION TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS, supra note 1, at 3, 8.
43 A recent National Academy panel urged integrating these effects into an
overall evaluation:
Policies designed to manage air pollution and land use may be
associated with unintended impacts on climate. Increasing evidence of
health effects makes it likely that aerosols and ozone will be the targets
of stricter regulations in the future. To date, control strategies have not
considered the potential climatic implications of emissions reductions.
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solution here is not to pump more sulfate aerosols into the
air while ignoring their adverse effects on public health, nor
to reduce their emissions while ignoring the adverse effect
on global warming; it is to recognize the risk-risk tradeoff
and take both effects into consideration.44
> Various geoengineering approaches have been identified to
forestall global warming if emissions limits turn out to be
inadequate or too late. These geoengineering options
include adding aerosol particles to the upper atmosphere to
reflect incoming solar radiation, or fertilizing plankton in
the oceans to soak up more CO 2 from the atmosphere, or
stationing systems of mirrors in space to reflect incoming
solar radiation. Each such proposal needs to be evaluated
for the risk-risk tradeoffs it may entail. Some uses of
geoengineering may be governed by current environmental
law such as the Ocean Dumping Act and related
international treaties, the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea, the Environmental Modification Treaty (barring
"hostile" environmental modification), and the treaties on
satellite orbits, the Moon and Outer Space.
> Carbon capture and storage systems require some place to
store the carbon, such as deep well injections and caverns;
these storage sites could turn out to leak, gradually undoing
some of their CO 2 sequestration benefits, or even abruptly
leaking large amounts and thereby asphyxiating local biota
or posing seismic stress.45 These deep storage sites may be
Regulations targeting black carbon emissions or ozone precursors
would have combined benefits for public health and climate. However,
because some aerosols have a negative radiative forcing, reducing their
concentrations could actually increase radiative warming. ...
PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS: Apply climate models to the
investigation of scenarios in which aerosols are significantly reduced
over the next 10 to 20 years and for a range of cloud microphysics
parameterizations. Integrate climate forcing criteria in the development
of future policies for air pollution control and land management.
COMM. ON RADIATIVE FORCING EFFECTS ON CLIMATE, supra note 1, at 10.
44 For one effort to incorporate such multiple conflicting effects into a full
analysis, see RONALD G. PRINN ET AL., MIT JOINT PROGRAM ON SCIENCE AND
POLICY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, EFFECTS OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ON CLIMATE,
Report No. 118 (2005), available at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/
MITJPSPGCRpt1 18.pdf.
41 See WORKING GROUP III, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT: CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE, SUMMARY
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regulated under current environmental laws governing
underground waste injection, oil and gas extraction, and
safe drinking water; EPA is currently developing a
regulation on underground carbon storage pursuant to the
SDWA.46
At the same time, successfully addressing climate change
could produce significant ancillary co-benefits, such as:
> Reductions in CO2 emissions (and other GHG emissions
such as black carbon47 ), if achieved by reducing combustion
of fossil fuels (especially coal, and a shift to energy
conservation or to alternative energy sources such as
nuclear or solar), would likely mean public health co-
benefits in reduced emissions of other pollutants associated
with fossil fuel combustion. Air pollution from coal
combustion, such as sulfur dioxide (S0 2) and nitrogen
oxides, is estimated to take thousands of lives per year in
the U.S., and in China; due to these public health effects
alone, without considering the climate effects, studies find
that coal-fired combustion is significantly underpriced.48
Oil spills from tanker ships and pipelines might also decline
if oil were used less for motor vehicles and home heating.
Over time, a strong and sustained climate policy might
eventually render superfluous major provisions of the
current CAA, Oil Pollution Act, and other statutes that
address the residuals of fossil fuel combustion (while
perhaps introducing, as noted above, the need for new laws
to deal with the new risks posed by new energy systems).
> Note that if climate policy involves measures that do not
reduce fossil fuel combustion-such as geoengineering, or
FOR POLICYMAKERS 12-15 (2005).
46 See 73 Fed. Reg. 43,492 (July 25, 2008).
47 See V. Ramanathan & G. Carmichael, Global and Regional Climate
Changes due to Black Carbon, 1 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 221, 226 (2008) (finding
that black carbon has a significantly greater influence on radiative forcing than
earlier estimates, and observing that reductions in black carbon could yield major
public health benefits, especially in China, India and other developing countries).
48 See H. Spencer Banzhaf, Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer, Efficient
Emission Fees in the U.S. Electricity Sector, 26 RESOURCE AND ENERGY
ECONOMICS 317 (2004) (finding that the price of coal would be much higher, and
higher than other fuels, if the full social, health and environmental costs of each
fuel were internalized in the price system).
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major expansion of sinks, or carbon capture & storage
(without affecting other pollutants) from coal-fired power
plants-then these co-benefits in reduced conventional
pollutants may not occur.
Credit for avoided deforestation could, provide a major
stimulus for biodiversity conservation, while also reducing
the costs of GHG abatement.49
> Other ancillary benefits of climate policy could include, for
example, reduced traffic fatalities as mass transit substitutes
for automobiles, and improved cardiovascular health and
social capital as housing clustered near mass transit routes
substitutes for sprawl.
The solution to these risk-risk tradeoffs, such as cross-gas and
cross-sector shifts, is not to give up on GHG regulation. Both
ancillary harms (countervailing risks) and ancillary benefits can be
addressed through the design and scope of the regulatory system.
First, the scope of the regulatory system should internalize the
externalities of regulation. 50 Regulating more comprehensively, by
covering all the major GHGs and economic sectors in the
regulatory system, is environmentally superior because it matches
the scope of the climate problem, avoids perverse cross-gas and
cross-sector shifts, and encourages conservation of forest sinks.51
It may also encourage more co-benefits from reduction of GHGs
such as black carbon that also pose local public health impacts. 52
And it is economically superior because it offers the flexibility to
49 See Jonathan B. Wiener, Making Markets for Global Forests
Conservation, in PAINTING THE WHITE HOUSE GREEN: RATIONALIZING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSIDE THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
(Randall Lutter & Jason F. Shogren eds., 2004); Massimo Tavoni, Brent
Sohngen & Valentina Bossetti, Forestry and the Carbon Market Response to
Stabilize Climate, 35 ENERGY POLICY 5346 (2007).
50 See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 14.
5' See RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 2; Stewart & Wiener,
supra note 8; Wiener, Protecting the Global Environment, supra note 39, at 193-
225.
52 See James Hansen et al., Global warming in the twenty-first century: An
alternative scenario, 97 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
9875-80 (no. 18) (2000), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/97/18/
9875.full.pdf+html; Ramanathan & Carmichael, supra note 47. Note that black
carbon is not yet included in the Kyoto Protocol, Annex A, list of regulated
GHGs, but could be added in the future. Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37
I.L.M. 22 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005).
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choose the least-cost abatement opportunities across all GHGs and
sectors.53
The FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol made progress in this
direction, covering most major GHGs and all sectors, despite
opposition from the EU which preferred a C0 2-only approach.54
The EU Emissions Trading System went back to covering CO2
only in its pilot phase (2005-07), while promising to broaden its
scope to address other GHGs in subsequent phases. Several of the
major bills pending in the U.S. Congress would cover most GHGs
and most sectors, though some omit agriculture and forests. U.S.
policy could lead the way to a more fully comprehensive scope for
global climate policy.
Second, the adoption of climate policy should take account of
risk-risk tradeoffs through impact assessments. As noted above,
this is already required under FCCC article 4(1)(f). In the U.S., it
is also required under Executive Order 12866 and its guidelines; in
Europe this is required under the Impact Assessment Guidelines
(discussed further in the next section of this article). One
improvement in the U.S. approach would be for Congress itself to
consider risk-risk tradeoffs when enacting new climate legislation
(as is done in Europe), rather than leaving that step only to the
federal agencies when they promulgate rules implementing
legislative instructions.
B. Benefit-Cost
Benefit-cost tradeoffs should also be considered in making
climate policy. But they may not always be cognizable under
current U.S. law. For example, under the CAA, EPA must set the
NAAQS without considering cost.55  This condition is curious
enough for conventional pollutants-how can the agency decide
how much pollution control is enough? The statute says EPA
53 See RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 2; J. Reilly et al., The
Role of Non-C0 2 GHGs in Climate Policy: Analysis Using the MIT IGSM,
special issue 3 THE ENERGY JOURNAL 503 (2006), available at
http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC-ReprintO6-1O.pdf; John Reilly et
al., Multi-gas Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol, 401 NATURE 549, 551 (1999)
(finding a 60% reduction in cost from a comprehensive multi-gas policy
compared to a C0 2-only policy).
54 See Wiener, Something Borrowed, supra note 11, at 1308-09.
55 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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should choose the level "requisite to protect the public health," but
public health is affected to some degree at any pollution level,
more or less; the question is how healthy, how much pollution
control.56 Or, put another way, why should EPA ever set the
NAAQS above zero (or above the background level), when a
tighter (toward zero) NAAQS would save some additional people
from some exposure? The answer must be that something else
society values would be sacrificed by tightening the standard
further; 57 EPA, however, is not permitted to acknowledge this. 58
The prohibition on considering costs in setting NAAQS is a prime
example of the obstacles to candid recognition of tradeoffs that are
embedded in much current environmental law. Unable to compare
costs and benefits forthrightly, the agency avoids regulating,59 or
conceals its consideration of costs and benefits while asserting
other rationales, or distorts and corrupts the science in order to try
to justify a decision to set the NAAQS at a positive level.60
Even if this cost-blind approach were warranted for
conventional pollutants, however, it is clearly inappropriate for
climate change. The economic cost of restricting GHG emissions
could be quite high, depending on the stringency and type of
policy instrument employed. Indeed, the FCCC directs its parties
16 See id. at 490-96 (Breyer, J., concurring). The degree and direction of the
effect on health at low doses will depend on the shape of the dose-response
function (e.g., linear, threshold, or hormetic).
5' Sensible environmental. groups recognize this. For example, commenting
on the latest tightening of the ozone NAAQS, even while urging them to be
tighter: "John M. Balbus, a physician and the chief health scientist at the
Environmental Defense Fund, said, 'Clearly at some point you get to a level
where additional benefits just aren't worth it, but I don't think we're there at
75."' Matthew L. Wald, Environmental Agency Tightens Smog Standards, N.Y.
TIMES, March 13, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/13/
washington/13enviro.html.
5' American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 471 n.4 (if -EPA were "secretly
considering the costs of attainment.., it would be grounds for vacating the
NAAQS").
59 See JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE
REGULATION: How OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA
(2003). This may be one reason that EPA has been reluctant to regulate CO 2
under the CAA: knowing that cost could not be considered under key parts of the
law, the agency may have sought to avoid getting started. If so, allowing
consideration of cost could encourage, rather than discourage (as is often feared),
some regulation.
60 See Cary Coglianese & Gary Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of
Sciencd in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1255 (2004).
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(of which the U.S. is one) to consider cost: it makes clear in
Article 2 that while achieving its objective of avoiding dangerous
climate change, parties must "ensure that food production is not
threatened and.., enable economic development to proceed in a
sustainable manner." It provides in Article 3(3) that "policies and
measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so
as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost." And in
Article 4(1)(f), quoted above, the FCCC calls for "impact
assessments" or similar methods to "minimize the adverse effects
on the economy" of climate policy.
At the national level, both the U.S. and European regulatory
systems have espoused routine application of benefit-cost analysis
in regulatory impact analyses. 6' Every U.S. President since Jimmy
Carter has required economic analysis of new regulations. This
paper is not the place (nor is there space here) to mount a full
explanation and defense of a sensible version of benefit-cost
decision making, but it should at least be clear that sound decision
making on climate change policy requires consideration of the
important social consequences of each option.62 Even advocates of
stringent regulation of GHG emissions have, generally, not argued
that costs should be ignored; rather, they have argued that the
benefits (avoided damages) from climate policy exceed the costs
and therefore justify regulations. 63
61 Jonathan B. Wiener, Better Regulation in Europe, 59 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 447 (2006).
62 The science of climate change is necessary but insufficient to make policy
choices, because those policy choices also depend on value judgments about how
much risk is acceptable given that further risk reduction would entail sacrifices in
other social objectives. Thus, the debate over whether global warming is "real"
or not has been asking the wrong question. A complex future problem like
climate change is neither "real" nor "false," but is probabilistic and uncertain.
Uncertainty does not necessarily warrant inaction about such a risk; it often
makes sense to purchase insurance against uncertain risks, as we have done for
accidents, fires, a Soviet nuclear missile attack, and other uncertain risks. Taking
uncertainty into account, a well-designed low-cost climate policy can be
desirable. On the other hand, certainty (saying it's "real") would not necessarily
warrant drastic action; it would still make sense to weigh the benefits against the
costs to choose the best options.
63 One exception is Douglas Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural
Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REV.
555 (2004) (advocating cultural transformation toward an environmental ethic to
combat climate change, and arguing against comparison of costs and benefits in
climate policy). But effective policy action to prevent climate change through
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By benefit-cost analysis (BCA), I do not mean a strict
quantified optimization that omits important but unquantified
benefits. Rather, BCA should mean a "warm" or "soft" guide to
informing decisions that helps decision makers ensure they
consider all important consequences of policy choices. 64 It should
inform rather than dictate public regulatory decisions. And in the
case of climate change, applying BCA does not necessarily favor
watering down or restraining the policy response. Indeed it can
mean strengthening climate policy. Whereas some analysts see
modest benefits to climate policy,65 others see high benefits
(especially due to potential low-probability high-consequence
catastrophic impacts).66 Moreover, a policy guided by BCA can
chart a path of optimal emissions over the next few decades that
involves more stringent policy limits than does the emissions path
of a "least-cost" strategy to stabilize atmospheric GHG
concentrations at a specified level such as 550 ppm, because the
BCA path gives weight to the interim damages from ongoing
climate change whereas the least-cost path to stabilization does
not.
67
The upshot is that an integrated approach to U.S. climate
change policy, recognizing cross-cutting issues and tradeoffs, will
best be accomplished through new legislation that encompasses all
major GHGs and all sectors of the economy, and gives credit for
protection of sinks. It should attend to risk-risk and benefit-cost
tradeoffs within the climate policy design itself through
GHG emissions reductions may be needed long before such a cultural
transformation could unfold. Moreover, a cultural transformation in the U.S.
may not influence China's policies and global GHG emissions trajectories.
Consequentialist analysis and incentives are more likely to engage the U.S. and
China in effective climate policy. See Jonathan'1B. Wiener, Climate Change
Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1805 (2008).
64 See Wiener, Better Regulation in Europe, supra note 61 (advocating
"warm analysis" of the kind espoused by Benjamin Franklin).
65 See, e.g., BJORN LOMBORG, COOL IT: THE SECULAR ENVIRONMENTALIST'S
GUIDE TO GLOBAL WARMING (2007).
66 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004);
MARTIN WEITZMAN, ON MODELING AND INTERPRETING THE ECONOMICS OF
CATASTROPHIC CLtMATE CHANGE (2008), available at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/weitzman/files/modeling.pdf.
7 See RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 2; James K. Hammitt,
Evaluation Endpoints and Climate Policy: Atmospheric Stabilization, Benefit-
Cost Analysis, and Near-Term Greenhouse-Gas Emissions, 41 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 447 (1999).
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comprehensive coverage and instructions to reduce overall risk,
and via surrounding legal measures such as ex ante and ex post
impact assessment of proposed policies (e.g. NEPA and OMB
regulatory review). The basic benefit-cost judgment about the
level of emissions to allow (through a cap-and-trade or tax
instrument) should initially be made by Congress (rather than
delegated to EPA), as it was in the Acid Rain Trading Program of
the 1990 CAA.68 This put the main question of social tradeoffs in
the hands of Congress, rather than delegating the policy objective
to the agency as many current environmental laws have done.
69
But Congress is not institutionally well-equipped to conduct or
rely on BCA, and when setting goals (such as the allowance cap)
for climate policy, it should be informed in this judgment by
experts' impact assessments (as is now done in the EU).
Individual members of Congress often request such impact
assessments from relevant agencies, such as EPA and DOE;
perhaps the General Accountability Office (GAO) or
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) could beef up its capacity to
serve Congress more consistently and coherently in conducting
impact assessments of major pending legislation.
In climate policy, an adaptive management approach to
benefit-cost tradeoffs could be implemented through multi-year
targets combined with periodic revision. Congress could set a
68 In 1990, Congress set two phases of SO 2 allowance caps during the next
decade. Clean Air Act of 1990, Pub. Law. 101-549 §§ 404-405 (1990). Later,
EPA effectively tightened the cap further in its Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR)
issued in 2005. CAIR was invalidated by the D.C. Circuit on July 11, 2008. See
North Carolina v. E.P.A., No. 05-1244 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
69 See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (Yale Univ. Press, 1993)
(critiquing Congressional delegation to agencies); Bruce Ackerman & Richard B.
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market
Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVT'L L. 171 (1988) (arguing that market-based
incentives will put the question of the social objective-the aggregate level of
pollution-before Congress, rather than concealing it in agency decisions on
each rulemaking); David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to
my Critics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731 (1999). Lisa Heinzerling argues in Selling
Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L. REv. 300 (1995) that
Congress did not actually confront the social objective question in its
deliberations over the acid rain emissions trading program in the 1990 CAA
amendments, but she neglects the evidence that Congress weighed costs in
choosing among different caps on SO 2 emissions. To be sure, Congress could
benefit from enhanced institutional support to conduct impact assessments of
pending legislation.
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multi-year schedule of declining caps on emissions over the
coming decades, and then direct itself, or call on an expert body
(such as EPA, or OMB, or a new "Carbon Fed" modeled after the
apolitical Federal Reserve Bank), to review and adjust the schedule
over time as new information warrants, in light of benefit-cost
analyses, perhaps including regular reviews conducted by the
National Academy of Sciences. This approach could serve both
the objectives of containing costs and attaining the environmental
benefits being sought as information and understanding improve
over time. Of course, Congress itself could always amend or
repeal its climate legislation, but too easy resort to wholesale
changes would undermine the incentives for investors to develop
and adopt low-GHG technologies. Setting a longer-term multi-
year schedule of emissions limits (rather than a one-time near-term
target) will give a more credible signal to investors to promote
innovation and diffusion. Climate is a complex problem where
learning over time will surely inform sequential adjustments in that
long-term schedule. Giving the lead role (though always subject to
amendment by Congress), or at least an advisory role, on any
subsequent revisions to an expert body like EPA, OMB or a
Carbon Fed (or all three in collaboration), informed by BCA,
would harness the relevant expertise that Congress itself lacks,
confront important tradeoffs in a transparent setting, and sustain
investors' confidence in the future of the policy and the market. In
addition, as U.S. climate change policy is enacted and
implemented, impact assessment using BCA (as defined above)
should be applied to each act of Congress, and (as is now routine)
to each major agency rulemaking.
Perhaps climate policy, by showing the need for integrated
cross-sectoral approaches that candidly confront risk-risk and
benefit-cost tradeoffs, will also stimulate reform of these features
of current environmental law. For example, climate policy may
integrate agriculture and forestry into an economy-wide regime, in
light of the low-cost GHG abatement opportunities in those
sectors, the concern (noted above) that GHG emissions could shift
(leak) to farms if production of crop-based fuels such as ethanol
were unregulated, and the need to persuade key developing
countries to include agriculture and forests in their baselines and
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emissions limits. 70
Alternatively, lawmakers may be glad to adopt these
improved approaches in a new climate policy, but reluctant to
reopen settled questions in past laws. Revision of past laws will be
more likely if climate policy increases the benefits of doing so or
lowers its costs. For example, if climate policy results in the
development of new methods to monitor GHG emissions from
non-point area sources, those monitoring methods could then make
it attractive to apply them to conventional pollution from farms.
III. INCENTIVES
Perhaps the most remarkable change in environmental law
over the past three decades has been the shift from acrimony
toward consensus over market-based economic incentive
instruments such as cap and trade. Climate policy should make
use of these incentive instruments because, by allowing flexibility
in how and where emissions are reduced (and in some programs,
when they are reduced, via banking and borrowing), these policy
design features significantly reduce the cost of abatement and
enhance the stimuli for innovation. Studies find that full
allowance trading can reduce the cost of GHG abatement by half
or more compared to no-trading scenarios. 71 And because GHGs
mix globally in the atmosphere, with essentially no local effects,
the concern that allowance trading may yield hotspots of excessive
local damage is not significant for GHGs.
A generation ago, the debate raged between advocates of
command-and-control technology standards and advocates of
market-based incentives. Today that question has largely been
70 If climate policy achieves this cross-sectoral integration, that could show
the way to doing the same in conventional Clean Water Act pollution policy
(where non-point sources such as farms have traditionally been left out of
regulations applied to industry).
71 See RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 2. Together with the
60 percent or greater cost reduction associated with comprehensive multi-gas
policy, see Reilly et al., Multi-Gas Assessment, supra note 53, the 50% or greater
cost reduction from emissions trading would yield an 80% or greater cost
reduction for a comprehensive multi-gas cap-and-trade policy as compared to
fixed C0 2-only emissions limits with no trading. See id. Publicizing and
explaining this dramatic effect of improved policy design may be needed to help
break the logjam confronting new environmental laws, as discussed in the
introductory section of this article.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
[Volume 17
HeinOnline  -- 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 236 2008-2009
CLIMATE POLICY TO BREAK THE LOGJAM
settled with broad acceptance of incentive instruments, while
recognizing that they will not be superior in every case. A key
factor in this change was the SO 2 allowance trading system to
control acid rain (designed by the first Bush administration in
1989-90, in collaboration with the Environmental Defense Fund),
its bipartisan enactment by Congress in the 1990 CAA
amendments, and the subsequent success of that pro am:. it
reduced emissions faster than expected, at far lower costs.T
At about the same time, in 1990-92, the U.S. advocated the
inclusion of market-based emissions trading in a climate regime,
though some in the U.S. government resisted a binding cap.73 In
these early years of climate negotiations, the EU was opposed to
trading. In the Clinton administration, the U.S. continued its
advocacy of emissions trading, now with explicit support for a
quantitative cap (target) on emissions. Despite EU resistance to
trading, the U.S. obtained a short paragraph authorizing
international emissions trading in Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol
in 1997, but without spelling out how the system would work. The
EU still sought to constrain that policy option through restrictions
on how much a country could satisfy its target through trading
(inserting the term "supplemental" in Article 17) and other criteria.
But after the new President Bush withdrew the U.S. from
Kyoto in 2001, and because the EU needed to persuade Russia to
ratify for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force, the EU then
changed its mind, and began to favor market-based incentives.
The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), launched in 2004, is
now the largest such cap and trade system in the world.
Meanwhile, in the U.S. the major environmental groups,
formerly sharply divided on this question, now appear to agree that
a cap and trade approach would be ideal to limit GHG emissions.
And major corporations, seeing climate legislation on the horizon,
are beginning to publicly endorse cap and trade as a low-cost
method. All the major bills currently pending in the U.S. Congress
would launch cap and trade systems.74
72 See DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL, MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID
RAIN PROGRAM (2000).
73 See Wiener, Something Borrowed, supra note 11 (recounting the early
history of U.S. support for a cap-and-trade system for GHGs).
74 On the roles of interest groups and rent-seeking in climate change law, see
Jonathan B. Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental
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The current debate in the U.S. regarding climate policy
instrument choice is not the old argument about command-and-
control technology standards versus market-based incentives, but
rather the new contest between two types of market-based
incentives, trading and taxes.
In principle, taxes and allowance trading instruments can
achieve nearly identical results, but there are some key differences.
First, GHG taxes raise revenue which can be used to offset other
distortionary taxes (such as taxes on income to labor and capital)
and thereby reap a "double dividend" from "revenue recycling. 75
But cap and trade can generate the same revenues if allowances are
sold (auctioned) rather than issued for free.
Second, under uncertainty about true costs of abatement, a tax
limits the price of controlling emissions (but might let emissions
rise) whereas an allowance system limits the quantity of emissions
(but might let the price of controlling emissions rise). Which
instrument is preferable depends on the relative harm from
emissions rising versus the harm from prices rising.76 Some
economists favor GHG taxes over allowances on this ground,
arguing that price increases impose more sharply rising harms
whereas emissions increases only gradually add to the stock of
atmospheric GHG concentrations and thus pose only gradually
rising harms.7  But if rising GHG concentrations were
approaching an abrupt threshold of sharply increasing harm, then
emissions escalation might pose more extreme harms than cost
Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749 (1999). On the recent realignment of interest
groups to support cap and trade for GHGs in the Congress, see DeShazo &
Freeman, supra note 9.
75 See A. Lars Bovenberg & Ruud A. de Mooij, Environmental Levies and
Distortionary Taxation, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 1085, 1085 (1994); Lawrence H.
Goulder, Environmental Taxation and the "Double Dividend": A Reader's
Guide, 2 Int'l Tax & Pub. Fin. 157 (1995); Ian W.H. Parry, Lawrence H. Goulder
& Dallas Burtraw, Revenue-Raising Versus Other Approaches to Environmental
Protection: The Critical Significance of Preexisting Tax Distortions, 28 RAND J.
ECON. 708 (1997); Ian W.H. Parry, Pollution Taxes and Revenue Recycling, 29 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. S64, S65 (1995).
76 See Martin L. Weitzman, Prices versus Quantities, 41 REv. ECON. STUD.
477 (1974).
" See IAN W.H. PARRY & WILLIAM A. PIZER, EMISSIONS TRADING VS. CO 2
TAXEs VS. STANDARDS (2007), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/
Publications/upload/31809_1.pdf; William A. Pizer, Combining Price and
Quantity Controls to Mitigate Global Climate Change, 85 J. Public Econ. 409
(2002).
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escalation. In any case, allowance trading systems can be designed
to contain costs, such as through (i) trading across time periods
(cumulative multiyear target periods, banking, and borrowing), (ii)
a broader trading market (linking to international trading markets
and to offsets in other sectors), (iii) a "safety valve" in which the
government sells additional allowances at a pre-set trigger price
(essentially converting the cap and trade system into a tax at that
price; this trigger price might be set to increase slightly each year,
and the revenues could be dedicated to purchasing GHG emissions
abatement),78 or (iv) an allowance reserve (in effect, a safety valve
with a finite quantity of additional permits to be sold at the trigger
price). 79 Through these kinds of design features, a cap-and-trade
system can moderate uncertainty about its costs.
Third, allowance systems can be designed to engage
participation by reluctant parties, through allocation of headroom
allowances that can then be sold in the market. This form of side
payment is the way that the U.S. acid rain SO2 trading program
was designed to assure adoption in Congress, the way the Kyoto
Protocol engaged Russia, and the way that the EU allocated
burdens in its Emissions Trading System so as to succeed in
engaging all its member states (after being unable to succeed in
getting member states to agree to an EU carbon tax).8° It can also
be a way to engage China, India and other major developing
countries in a post-Kyoto regime. Such side payments are
especially crucial at the international level where participation in a
treaty requires the consent of each country. 8 1 Within the U.S.,
78 On these cost containment features to reduce price uncertainty in a cap and
trade system, see Stavins, supra note 8, at 315-16, 352; Pizer, supra note 77.
79 See BRIAN C. MURRAY, RICHARD G. NEWELL & WILLIAM A. PIZER,
BALANCING COST AND EMISSIONS CERTAINTY: AN ALLOWANCE RESERVE FOR
CAP-AND-TRADE (Duke University 2008), available at
http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/institute/wp-costemissions.pdf. The allowance
reserve, like the safety valve, could operate automatically when the market price
rises to hit the previously selected trigger price; or perhaps the allowance reserve
(or other cost containment mechanisms) could be managed by a "Carbon Fed"
board with the power to authorize additional allowance sales or greater use of
offset credits, or otherwise moderate prices. Id.
80 See FRANK CONVERY, DENNY ELLERMAN & CHRISTIAN DE PERTHUIS, THE
EUROPEAN CARBON MARKET IN ACTION: LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TRADING
PERIOD - INTERIM REPORT (2008), available at
http://www.aprec.net/documents/08-03-25 interimreporten.pdf.
81 See Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation, supra note 8;
RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 2.
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studies suggest that an allowance allocation of just 10 to 15
percent (if information on firms' burdens is not difficult to obtain)
could be sufficient to fully compensate the hardest-hit firms,82 and
just part of that amount may be all that is needed to overcome their
political opposition sufficiently to ensure adoption. A tax, by
contrast, is unlikely to attract participation by major emitting
countries who see abatement costs but few climate benefits.
Trying to combine the tax with a side-payment to the country
being taxed could undermine the incentive effect of the tax on
emissions (a problem solved by the allowance cap). 83 In addition,
at the international level, countries could adopt GHG taxes but
simultaneously modify other internal fiscal policies (taxes or
subsidies) to cushion the effect of the GHG tax on their economies,
thus vitiating the GHG tax in a way that is difficult for the
international community to monitor and deter; a cap-and-trade
system solves this problem by limiting aggregate emissions
irrespective of internal fiscal maneuvering. 84 Thus, in general, the
choice of instrument relates directly to the question of scale
(addressed in the next section), and in particular, an international
cap-and-trade system is likely to be superior to an international
tax.
The current debate also addresses particular elements of a
trading system, including:
> how stringent a cap to set, and over what time period,
> which sectors to cover (economy-wide, or electric power,
82.See Stavins, supra note 8, at 320-21; DALLAS BURTRAW & KAREN
PALMER, COMPENSATION RULES FOR CLIMATE POLICY IN THE ELECTRICITY
SECTOR, RFF DISCUSSION PAPER 07-41 (July 2007); A. Lans Bovenberg &
Lawrence H. Goulder, Neutralizing the Adverse Industry Impacts of C02
Abatement Policies: What Does It Cost?, in BEHAVIORAL AND DISTRIBUTIONAL
EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Carlo Carraro and Gilbert Metcalf, eds.,
University of Chicago Press, 2001).
83 For more detail on participation and the efficacy of allowance trading
versus taxes, see RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 2; Wiener,
Global Environmental Regulation, supra note 8.
14 See Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation, supra note 8, at 785-87
(identifying the problem of "fiscal cushioning" in international climate policy
and explaining that it is easier to solve under a cap-and-trade system than under a
tax); cf JOSEPH ALDY, EDUARDO LEY & IAN PARRY, A TAX-BASED APPROACH TO
SLOWING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, RFF DISCUSSION PAPER 08-26, at 26-28
(2008) (proposing complex monitoring regimes to try to salvage an international
GHG tax from fiscal cushioning), available at
http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-08-26.pdf
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industry, transportation, agriculture, forests),
> allocation (whether allowances would be issued for free or
auctioned, or some of each, as discussed above; and whether
credit should be given for early abatement efforts),
> cost containment (such as a "safety valve" maximum
allowance price at which the government would sell
unlimited additional allowances, a limited quantity reserve
of additional allowances, or a "Carbon Fed" oversight board
to manage the allowance market),
> international competitiveness provisions (such as border
taxes or border allowance requirements on imports from
countries without caps),
> the availability of "offset" credits from unregulated sectors
(e.g., agriculture) and from international abatement projects.
Ideally, the U.S. approach would be economy-wide, thus
avoiding cross-sector leakage and harnessing the most cost-
effective abatement opportunities across the U.S. economy. The
broad coverage and widely-radiating influence of putting a price
on GHG emissions would obviate the detailed industry-specific
technical standards that have been typical of much past
environmental law.85 An economy-wide scope would also make
unnecessary the criteria and monitoring for "offset" credits in
unregulated sectors (though offset credits for carbon storage in
8' One possible impediment to the success of a cap-and-trade system or a tax
in reducing actual emissions could be institutional barriers to the influence of
price signals on emitting activities. In some cases, firms and households may not
reduce emissions much despite an increased price of emitting under the trading
or tax policy. For example, emissions in the electric power sector may be highly
responsive (elastic) to such price changes, but emissions from transportation and
buildings may be more inelastic because people's choices of which car and house
to own, and which neighborhood to live in (at a distance from work, schools and
shopping), are difficult to change in a short time. New energy-efficient buildings
and mass transit systems may take a long time to build and to link to patterns of
daily travel. If so, reducing emissions from transportation may warrant changes
in technical standards, and land use policies at the state and local level, to
complement national GHG emissions allowances or taxes. But technical energy
efficiency standards may raise costs, may perversely encourage greater use and
hence a rebound in emissions, and may discourage replacement of old equipment
with new equipment. See Stavins, supra note 8, at 328, 345-48. Other
institutional barriers such as subsidies for resource use may also conflict with
GHG reduction incentives; removing such subsidies could be both
environmentally and economically desirable.
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biological and geological repositories would still be needed).86
Although measuring emissions and sink sequestration in some
sectors (such as agriculture) may be more costly than the
measurement of emissions from the energy sector, that difference
in measurement cost will likely be dwarfed by the environmental
benefits and social cost savings of encompassing all sectors. And
the measurement task is endogenous-a function of incentives
provided for improved measurement approaches-and it can be
eased by using default measurement values that can be adjusted if
firms present more accurate and reliable measurement
information. 8
7
The U.S. approach should be part of a global regime (or set of
plurilateral regimes) that engages all major emitting countries.
This point is elaborated in the next section on Scale, below. Such
a global cap-and-trade regime would encompass a much larger
share of global emissions, avoid international leakage, harness the
most cost-effective abatement opportunities worldwide, and inhibit
exercise of market power in the allowance market. Moreover, it
would make unnecessary the border tariffs or other policies being
considered to mitigate the international competitiveness risks of a
U.S.-only policy. If the U.S. Congress enacts major climate
legislation in 2009 before a post-Kyoto global regime is fully
worked out, any such border tariffs should be applied
evenhandedly with domestic regulations to avoid WTO
invalidity.88 Another way to help engage major developing
86 Stavins, supra note 8, advocates an upstream cap-and-trade system that
would cover most of the U.S. economy, with offsets for carbon storage in
biological and geological sinks. But he omits non-CO2 GHGs and emissions
from sectors such as agriculture where they are not related to fossil fuel use (e.g.
nitrous oxide emissions from agricultural fertilizer). My approach would
encompass these gases and sectors in a broader scope.
8' See Jonathan B. Wiener, Solving the Precautionary Paradox: Policy
Approaches to Improve Measurement of Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks, in
NON-CO 2 GREENHOUSE GASES 527 (J. van Ham et al., eds., 1994).
88 See Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness
Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law (Nicholas
Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Duke University, Working Paper
NI-WP 07-02, 2007). Stavins, supra note 8, at 326-27, advocates a border GHG
allowance requirement on GHG-intensive products imported from countries not
limiting their GHG emissions, but only beginning 10 years after the U.S. cap-
and-trade policy is launched, in the hopes of thereby pressuring other countries to
act along with the U.S. Michael Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China
Problem, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 905 (2008), advocates mobilizing U.S. consumers to
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countries in such a global regime would be to embed conditional
steps in the U.S. regime: initial action (a cap and declining phases)
in the U.S. legislation, with the next steps (tighter cap phases)
contingent on some degree of action by other major emitters
including developing countries.
To the extent that the "logjam" in U.S. environmental
legislation is due to the high cost of enacting additional protective
measures, the use of market-based incentives should help
overcome that obstacle by offering more environmental protection
at less cost. The EU's adoption of its ETS for CO2 may not have
been breaking a logjam in European regulation, but it was
nonetheless spurred by the need to keep costs low and to distribute
burdens fairly among EU member states.
Market-based incentives are also better at stimulating
technological innovation than are traditional command-and-control
policies. Ironically, "technology-forcing" by government mandate
of a specific technology tends to stagnate, not spur technological
change. Government is usually behind industry in its awareness of
cutting-edge technology. And once. government mandates a
specific technology, that tends to freeze investment in research and
development (R&D). Market-based incentives, by contrast, give
firms a powerful incentive to develop more effective, lower-cost
methods to reduce pollution, saving the firm on abatement costs
and potentially freeing up excess allowances for sale to other
firms.89
It may be that successful climate policy will herald the
success of market-based incentives in environmental policy more
generally. This may be true over a much longer time horizon than
the current environmental law era. After five centuries of
transition from feudalism (central control of decisions) to markets
(decentralized competitive decisions) in land, labor and capital, it
is not implausible that climate policy will represent the next stage
in that evolution, shifting from centralized control to decentralized
insist on disclosure of the GHG emissions embodied in imports from China.
89 See Adam B. Jaffe et al., Technology Policy for Energy and the
Environment, 4 Innovation Policy and the Economy 35 (2003). Government
support for basic research may also be needed as a complement to incentives for
emissions reductions, see Jaffe, Newell & Stavins, supra note 8. But
government research alone is insufficient to motivate diffusion and adoption of
new technologies, which requires incentives for emissions reductions (a price on
GHG emissions) as well.
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flexibility (although subject to a centralized societal constraint-
the "cap" in cap and trade) and incorporating ecosystem services
into markets in a very big way. After the fall of the Soviet Union
and liberalization in China, on the one hand, and the failure of
deregulatory zeal in the U.S. on the other, all sides appear to agree
that both some regulation is needed and that command
requirements do not work as well as market-based incentives. 90
Whereas environmentalism in the 1970s portrayed markets and
capitalism as the enemy, today environmentalists see markets as
flawed but market-based incentives as attractive correctives,
reconstituting markets to internalize externalities. 9' This is
especially true for climate, where the costs of the central command
approach applied to all activities in the entire economy would be
prohibitive, and the concern over hotspots is absent. If so, a
successful market-based climate policy could seal the end of the
debate between environmentalism vs. capitalism, via a merging or
rapprochement. We will all be market-based environmentalists
now.
Another result of this change may be that markets in other
environmental resources catch on. There are already markets in
transferable fishing quotas, and efforts to create markets in
ecosystem services. These markets have been successful where
variations in the cost of compliance made flexibility across firms
attractive.9
2
Moreover, by putting a price on carbon, the new climate
policy will affect many other markets. Finance and investment
markets will respond by monetizing firms' carbon assets and
liabilities, assisted by SEC disclosure requirements. New
insurance policies will cover carbon assets, including carbon
sequestered in sinks. Real estate transactions will account for the
carbon assets or liabilities being transferred. By conferring market
value on undeveloped lands (at least those storing carbon), the
carbon market will both reward land conservation and reduce the
ability of landowners to claim "total" takings under restrictive land
90 For an assessment of progress so far, see Richard B. Stewart, A New
Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 21 (2001).
9' See Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 Md. L. Rev. 86 (1986).
92 See Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the
Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 117 (2005) (comparing U.S.
and Canadian uses of allowance markets to regulate SO 2 and fish catch).
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use regulation.93 Because GHG emissions are pervasive in every
sector of the economy, a market-based climate policy will radiate
its effects through the economy.
IV. SCALE
Climate change is a global problem: GHG emissions sources
and sinks are located in every country, and GHGs mix globally in
the atmosphere. As a result, GHG emissions (and abatement
measures) anywhere have the same impact on the global .climate.
The impacts of climate change will also be felt around the world,
although in varying ways: for example, warming may be greater
near the poles than at the equator, changes in precipitation and
disease will vary regionally, and coastal zones will be most
affected by sea level rise and storms.
Effective policies to forestall future climate change will
require action by at least the major emitting countries, that is, those
representing the great majority of current and future emissions.
This does not necessarily mean universal agreement among all 190
or so countries in the world, but it does mean that, unlike the
Kyoto Protocol, an effective treaty must encompass at least the 15
or 20 largest emitters. These include the U.S.A., China, the
European Union, Russia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Canada,
Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Korea and South Africa-and ideally
joined by others, including countries undergoing significant
deforestation.
Broad participation is vital in order to limit global emissions.
China's emissions have increased rapidly over the past decade,
exceeding forecasts; at the time the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in
1997, China was forecast to surpass the U.S. as the largest CO 2
emitter by about 2030; by 2006 that forecast date was advanced to
2009; and now it appears that China already passed the U.S. in
2007. 94 Looking ahead, China's emissions are forecast to grow as
93 As was claimed in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992). See Maria R. Reff, Reducing Regulatory Takings: Could Carbon
Credits Make Undeveloped Land Economically Viable? (Duke University School
of Law Independent Study Paper, 2007).
94 See Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China, supra
note 63, at 1807-10; INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY
OUTLOOK 2007 (2007); China to Top USA in Greenhouse Emissions, U.S.A.
TODAY, April 28, 2007, available at
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it relies heavily on coal-fired electric power. If China, India and
other developing countries are not engaged in limiting GHG
emissions, then stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at
a level such as 450 ppm (compared to about 380 ppm today, and
275 ppm in the pre-industrial era) looks to be impossible (because
emissions from those countries alone, when added to today's
concentrations due to prior emissions, will exceed that level); and
stabilizing at a higher level such as 550 ppm would be feasible but
at much greater cost and with much sharper emissions reductions
in the industrialized countries. 95
Broad participation is also essential to prevent cross-border
"leakage" of emitting activities from regulated to unregulated
areas. Emissions leakage can occur via relocation of facilities
from regulated to unregulated places, and via price changes for
goods in world markets (reduced energy demand in one country
lowers world prices and increases the quantity consumed
elsewhere). Leakage undermines the environmental effectiveness
of partial policy actions-at least partially, and possibly even
yielding perverse increases in overall emissions. A recent study by
the MIT Integrated Assessment model found high leakage rates,
even above 100 percent, which is possible where emissions per
unit of production are higher in the unregulated countries receiving
the leakage than in the regulated countries.96 Reports from specific
sectors have indicated even higher leakage rates. 97 Thus, partial
http://www.usatoday.com/weather/climate/globalwarming/
2007-04-24-china-emissionsN.htm (quoting lEA chief economist Fatih Birol's
account of China's increased reliance on fossil fuels and its rapid increase in
GHG emissions, now exceeding U.S. emissions).
95 See J. EDMONDS ET AL., STABILIZING CO 2 CONCENTRATIONS WITH
INCOMPLETE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (2007). Note that the feasibility,
emissions reductions, and costs depend on the date by which stabilization of
atmospheric concentrations must occur, as well as on the concentration level of
such stabilization. Edmonds et al. examine several different scenarios.
96 See Mustafa Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and
Carbon Leakage, 65 J. INT'L EcoN. 421, 421, 441 (2005) (finding "leakage rates
as high as 130%, in which case GHG control policies in the industrialized
countries actually lead to higher global emissions").
97 See Joseph Kahn & Mark Landler, China Grabs West's Smoke-Spewing
Factories, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2007, at Al ("the same hulking blast furnace,
dismantled and shipped piece by piece from Germany's old industrial heartland
to Hebei Province, China's new Ruhr Valley. The transfer, one of dozens since
the late 1990s, contributed to a burst in China's steel production, which now
exceeds that of Germany, Japan and the United States combined. It left Germany
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action by some countries, yet omitting other major emitters (as in
Kyoto), is at least partly undone by leakage and at worst could
increase, not decrease, global emissions.98  Indeed, some of
China's faster-than-forecast increase in emissions since about 1997
may be due to leakage from. Europe and other countries limiting
their GHG emissions after Kyoto.
Hence engaging China, India and other major developing
countries is crucial to the environmental efficacy of a climate
policy regime. Broad participation would also improve the
functioning of a cap and trade system. It would widen the range of
low-cost abatement opportunities and it would reduce the potential
for exercise of market power by large allowance holders.
But countries also face incentives not to join a global regime.
Reducing emissions incurs costs domestically and in the present,
whereas the benefits of reduced emissions are shared globally and
in the future. Thus each country has an incentive to free ride on
others' abatement efforts. Further, fear of cross-border "leakage"
compounds this incentive. And some countries may perceive
benefits from warming, such as increased agricultural output.
Thus a successful climate change policy regime, at least one
designed to limit GHG emissions, must engage countries in
cooperative action by promising sufficient shared benefits, or side
payments. Countries are only bound by treaties to which they
consent, so the treaty regime must make consent attractive. As
noted above (in the section on incentives) and as I have argued
elsewhere, a cap and trade system is best equipped to keep costs
low while offering side payments (in the form of headroom
allowances) to attract major developing countries to participate. 99
The international prospects for cooperation on climate policy
are evolving. Although a substantially global regime is needed to
protect the global environment, countries have diverse interests, so
with lost jobs and a bad case of postindustrial angst.... China's less efficient
steel mills, and its greater reliance on coal, meant that it emitted three times as
much carbon dioxide per ton of steel as German steel producers.") (emphasis
added).
98 At the same time, technological innovation and diffusion to unregulated
jurisdictions could counteract leakage to some degree. For a more detailed
discussion of leakage see Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The
Limits of Local Climate Policy, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1961, 1967-73 (2007).
99 See RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY, supra note 2; Wiener, Global
Environmental Regulation, supra note 8.
Imaged with Permission from N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal
20081
HeinOnline  -- 17 N.Y.U  Envtl. L.J. 247 2008-2009
N.Y. U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
some mechanism is needed to make cooperation attractive to the
countries significantly influencing the outcome. For major
developing countries whose priority is development-and who
view climate change as being of low importance or even as
benign-this means that climate policy must support their
development goals, not impose obstacles or costs to their
development.
Moreover, in the coming decades, we may see a more
multipolar geopolitical terrain with a larger club of "great
powers"--the United States, an organized Europe, a revived
Russia, a surging China, India, Brazil, and perhaps a few others-
in a new world order of multiplex relations, cooperating and
jousting over trade, debt, national security, climate, and other
issues. This may complicate the prospects for climate policy, but
it may also offer new opportunities for issue linkage (i.e., in-kind
side payments) to persuade countries to act together. And, a
country's identity as an emerging great power may give it a sense
of leadership that motivates action on world issues.
Within China, the perceived impacts of climate change (and
hence perceived benefits of prevention) may also be growing.
Recent studies suggest that shifting precipitation could lead to both
drought and flooding in China.100 Climate disruptions could lead
to political instability, worrying China's leadership, which has
committed to a "scientific concept of development" to achieve a
"harmonious society" that reduces inequity and pollution. 01 And
China's emergence as a great power could lead it to put greater
weight on the adverse climate impacts felt by its G-77 comrades in
India, Asia and Africa. Meanwhile, economic models show China
as a major beneficiary of a global cap and trade regime. Thus,
even though China has so far declined to engage in such a
regime, 10 2 it may be moving toward doing so-if the U.S. will
100 See Erda Lin & Ji Zou, HM Treasury, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND ITS
ECONOMICS IN CHINA, (Aug. 28, 2006).
101 See Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China, supra
note 63, at 1818-21. For interesting historical patterns of climate change and
dynastic change in China, see Gergana Yancheva et al., Influence of the
intertropical convergence zone on the East Asian monsoon, 445 NATURE 74
(2007); David D. Zhang et al., Climate Change and War Frequency in Eastern
China Over the Last Millennium, 35 HUM. ECOLOGY 403 (2007).
102 See ZhongXiang Zhang, Why Has China Not Embraced a Global Cap-
and-Trade Regime?, 7 Climate Policy 166 (2007).
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too. 103
At the national level, current U.S. law does not seem well
suited to the scale of climate change. The U.S. ratified the FCCC,
but did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and thus the U.S. is not party
to an international agreement quantitatively limiting GHG
emissions. A key reason for the U.S. decision not to ratify Kyoto
was the fear of leakage to unregulated countries such as China and
India; the U.S. Senate voted ninety-five to zero not to ratify such a
treaty in 1997,114 and citing this rationale, President Clinton never
submitted the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate. In 2001, President
Bush withdrew the U.S. from Kyoto.
In turn, the U.S. currently lacks national legislation to limit
GHG emissions. As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recently held that the CAA provides EPA the authority to regulate
GHG emissions, but the regulatory tools in the CAA are a
mismatch for a globally mixing pollutant. EPA can adopt controls
on new vehicles, fuels, and new stationary sources, but these will
not quickly address the large quantity of existing stationary
sources. For existing stationary sources, EPA must mainly rely on
the two-step NAAQS process, and the states must try to limit their
emissions to attain the NAAQS. Yet GHGs are globally mixing
pollutants whose concentrations within each state depend on
global, not local, emissions. Thus, no state could by itself attain a
binding ambient standard for C0 2; even were a state to stop the
growth in its own emissions, the ambient level (determined
globally) would only be marginally affected. 0 5 Even if all U.S.
103 See Wiener, Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China, supra
note 63 (discussing six factors that may be moving China toward engagement on
international GHG emissions limits); Ning Zeng'et al., Climate Change-the
Chinese Challenge, 319 SCIENCE 730 (2008) (suggesting China's potential
openness to a GHG tax or other limitations policy that reduces coal use in China,
if it can be designed to support China's economic development). In turn, in early
2008, the top U.S. climate official of the Bush administration said the U.S. could
join a quantitative cap and trade regime, if China and India would too. See
James Kanter & Andrew Revkin, Binding Emissions Treaty Still a Possibility,
U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/27/world/europe/27climate.html.
104 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). Subsequent
Senate votes in 2003 and 2005 on the McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship
Act received 44 and 38 votes, respectively, but still not a majority, nor the 60
votes needed to end debate in the Senate, nor the 67 needed to ratify a treaty.
105 This is true even assuming that the sources controlled or eliminated within
one state do not relocate or "leak" to other places. If such leakage does occur, as
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states acted together, the effect on global emissions (and hence on
global concentrations) would still be modest, unless other major
emitting countries also acted. The NAAQS/SIP process was aimed
at limiting exposure to locally controllable air pollutants (and even
for these, the NAAQS/SIP approach has proved problematic for
interstate transport of air pollutants); it seems a serious mismatch
to try to apply it to a globally emitted and globally mixing
pollutant.
If EPA is obliged to regulate GHGs from stationary sources
under the current CAA, there might be a better way: rather than
have all 50 states adopt futile SIPs, EPA could short-circuit this
process by declaring the SIPs inadequate to reduce ambient
concentrations, and promulgating a Federal Implementation Plan
(FIP) along with its NAAQS. The FIP would control emissions
nationally. It could employ a cap and trade system. Indeed EPA
has done this before, such as under its Clean Air Interstate Rule,
for which it invited states to join a FIP with a cap and trade
system. The definition of a FIP in CAA section 302 includes
market-based incentives as one option. EPA's promulgation of a
national cap and trade FIP for GHGs would enable it to adopt a
more coherent national policy, with a greater ability to attain a
NAAQS, while also giving EPA and the President leverage to
bargain over similar legislation pending in Congress. Indeed such
a strategy, following the Supreme Court's decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA and championed by the next President,
could a be key way to "break the logjam" by forcing Congress to
act on climate change.
Well-designed new climate legislation would therefore be
superior to regulating GHG emissions under the existing CAA.
Short of new national legislation and EPA action under the CAA,
the current situation is surprising: several states are enacting their
own GHG limitation policies. These include California (limiting
motor vehicle emissions and stationary source emissiofis), the
Western Climate Initiative (a group of states joining California),
several states emulating California's motor vehicles standard
(which they may do under a special provision of the CAA if EPA
at least some probably would, then the state's efforts to control its own ambient
level of CO2 via controls on emissions within the state would be even more futile
or counterproductive.
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eventually gives California a waiver of federal preemption of such
a standard-recently denied by EPA, but the question will be
litigated), RGGI (a group of northeastern states adopting a cap-
and-trade system), and other states. This is surprising because
each state faces disincentives: local costs to restrict its emissions;
benefits spread globally and into the future rather than enjoyed
within the state in the present; and fear of leakage. Indeed, leakage
may mean that state and local efforts will yield very little or even
negative net reduction in global emissions. There may also be
legal obstacles to state-level action on GHG emissions (absent
federal approval): states' efforts to prevent leakage may be
blocked by the Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, some state regulations may be preempted by federal
law such as the CAA (at least for mobile sources), states' efforts to
combine into regional initiatives might bump into the requirement
of Congressional approval under Interstate Compacts Clause, and
states' efforts to link up with countries or regions outside the U.S.
may be blocked by the Dormant Foreign Affairs clause. 10 6 By
contrast, if the states could act as part of a federal national regime,
in partnership with state efforts, then these obstacles could be
overcome, leakage could be reduced, and the states could employ
their own regulatory powers most effectively.10 7
Why might the states be acting? In addition to changes in
voters' preferences to favor such action (despite its high in-state
costs and low in-state benefits), and the political ambitions of
individual state leaders, there might be other motivations related to
policy entrepreneurship. States might be seeking to:
* learn how GHG emissions trading markets work in
anticipation 6f a federal cap and trade program;
" spur technological innovations that they can then sell to
others once a federal or international regime is established;
or
" create a patchwork of inconsistent state policies that will
106 On the states' policies and potential obstacles, see Wiener, Think Globally,
Act Globally, supra note 98.
107 See the op-ed along these lines by the Massachusetts secretary of energy
and environmental affairs. Ian Bowles, Want to Buy Some Pollution?, N.Y.
TIMES, March 15, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/15/
opinion/i 5bowles.html.
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spur industry to lobby for a uniform federal policy. 10 8
Yet such state actions may be counterproductive, by inducing
leakage (as discussed above), and by creating a patchwork of
inconsistent state policies that persist and become difficult to mesh
into a coherent federal policy.'0 9
Compared to the current scattershot of state-level initiatives
with little federal action on GHG emissions, a better U.S. policy
would involve at least three levels of scale:
> At the global level, the U.S. should engage China, Europe,
Russia, Japan, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Australia, Canada,
Mexico, Korea, South Africa, and other major countries in a
new regime to limit global GHG emissions (either as part of
the post-2012 Kyoto Protocol, or as a parallel regime in a
plurilateral approach), using international emissions trading
and a comprehensive multi-gas, -sector, -source and sink
design." 0 This global-scale should be sought during 2009,
the year the Bali Action Plan calls for a new post-Kyoto
regime to be determined, with "measurable, reportable and
verifiable" mitigation commitments by all countries.' 1
> At the national level, the U.S. should enact similarly
designed legislation in 2009, the first year of the next
Presidency, creating a cap and trade market in GHG
emissions allowances, covering all GHGs, sectors, sources
and sinks, and enabling U.S. actors to buy and sell
emissions allowances internationally. This would give EPA
a new task: tracking, monitoring and enforcing an allowance
trading market similar to but potentially larger than the one
created to control acid rain in 1990 (but a task much less
onerous, to EPA and society, than if EPA were to set
prescriptive technical standards for GHG emissions in each
of numerous industries). In turn, to make way for this new
responsibility, EPA should assign some of its current
responsibilities to the states.
> At the state level, the current state GHG policies (such as
108 See Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally, supra note 98; DeShazo &
Freeman, supra note 9.
109 See Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally, supra note 98.
l0 This approach is detailed in RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY, supra
note 2.
111 Bali Action Plan, supra note 6.
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RGGI and the Western States program) should be folded
into the new national and international cap-and-trade
program. Some key climate policy tools, such as electric
utility regulation, building codes, transportation systems,
and land use planning, are handled by the states. The new
national climate policy should encourage the use of such
state and local authorities to reduce GHG emissions, so long
as they do not impede the national cap-and-trade
program.' 12 Meanwhile, as the federal government takes on
the new task of running the GHG emissions limitation
policy, issues such as standards for drinking water quality,
air toxics, hazardous waste sites, and other issues posing
local impacts, should generally be handled by the states
rather than by the federal government (although the federal
government could still play a role where there are
economies of scale warranting a central national approach,
such as in conducting risk assessments, some policy
analyses, and technology R&D and evaluation, and in
providing a clearinghouse to disseminate information and
ideas across states).
This realignment of policies would address each problem at
its appropriate scale.
CONCLUSION
We have learned much over the past four decades about the
design of environmental policy, and we should apply this learning
to climate change. This article advocates a policy design for
climate change that succeeds on the four key design criteria:
integration, tradeoffs, incentives, and scale. It advocates a
comprehensive (multi-gas, sources and sinks, economy-wide),
incentive-based (cap-and-trade) approach with allowances mostly
auctioned and partly used to mollify serious opposition, and
appropriate mechanisms to contain both cost and emissions
escalation. This system would incorporate consideration of
112 See Bowles, supra note 107. Incorporating these state-level policies into a
broader federal and global regime would help avoid leakage. A key issue is
whether the federal law would preempt state policies. See ACSA, the
Lieberman-Wamer bill, supra note 13, would not preempt; indeed it would
encourage states to adopt more stringent policies.
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relevant tradeoffs (risk-risk and benefit-cost), and would chart a
long-term schedule of multi-year caps set by Congress and subject
to periodic adjustment by with input from an expert body (such as
EPA, or OMB, or a new "Carbon Fed") as new information
warrants. It would be adopted at the appropriate scale: an
international regime that effectively engages all major emitters,
including the U.S. and China, coupled with national and
subnational implementation.
A new climate change policy should learn from past
experience with environmental law. It should match its scope to
the extent of the externality, thus encompassing all sectors, GHGs,
sources and sinks, in the U.S. and in other major emitting
countries. It should address risk-risk and benefit-cost tradeoffs in
a candid and transparent way. And it should take advantage of the
cost savings, innovation and participation-attracting advantages of
market-based incentive instruments.
These strategies may help "break the logjam" by launching
the next major environmental legislation, on climate change.
Putting a price on GHG emissions, if well-designed, will radiate
throughout the economy, influencing myriad decisions in ways
that protect the climate, reduce local pollution, and improve land
use choices. A sound U.S. climate policy may also radiate
internationally, serving as an example to be emulated by other
countries. And the effects of good climate policy may radiate
further, nudging or forcing reform of past U.S. environmental law,
by showing the merits of superior approaches, and by putting
pressure on existing institutions to reorganize in the face of their
new responsibilities for climate policy.
That task is daunting enough, but it may be larger still.
Constructing a truly effective global climate regime will be a
strategic question of great power relations. Anticipating a coming
era of a more multipolar world order, the year 2009 may come to
resemble the year 1815, when Mettemich"13 designed the
multipolar regime to keep peace in Europe for a century. To break
the global logjam, to engage China and thereby engage the U.S., to
113 See HENRY KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED: METrERNICH,
CASTLEREAGH, AND THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE, 1812-1822 (1957) (describing
Metternich's diplomatic efforts, after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, to
construct a flexible multipolar system that would deter war among the great
powers of Europe).
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link smart domestic legislation with international cooperation, to
apply the best understanding of regulatory design in concert with
the best appreciation of national interests and global dynamics, in a
way that safeguards the planet while fostering prosperity and
equity, will require no less than a modem Mettemich.
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